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The Economics of Predation:
What Drives Pricing When There Is Learning-by-Doing?†
By David Besanko, Ulrich Doraszelski, and Yaroslav Kryukov*
We formally characterize predatory pricing in a modern industrydynamics framework that endogenizes competitive advantage and
industry structure. As an illustrative example we focus on learningby-doing. To disentangle predatory pricing from mere competition
for efficiency on a learning curve we decompose the equilibrium
pricing condition. We show that forcing firms to ignore the predatory incentives in setting their prices can have a large impact and
that this impact stems from eliminating equilibria with predationlike behavior. Along with the predation-like behavior, however, a fair
amount of competition for the market is eliminated. (JEL D21, D43,
D83, K21, L13, L41)
Predatory pricing—a deliberate strategy of pricing aggressively in order to eliminate competitors—is one of the more contentious areas of antitrust policy. Scholars
such as Edlin (2012) argue that predatory pricing can, under certain circumstances,
be a profitable business strategy. Others—commonly associated with the Chicago
School—suggest that predatory pricing is rarely rational and thus unlikely to be
practiced or, as Baker (1994) puts it, somewhere between a white tiger and a unicorn—a rarity and a myth.
At the core of predatory pricing is a trade-off between lower profit in the short
run due to aggressive pricing and higher profit in the long run due to reduced competition. But as the debate over the efficacy—and even the existence—of predatory
pricing suggests, it is not necessarily straightforward to translate this intuitive understanding into a more precise characterization of what predatory pricing actually is.1
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and we are indebted to Hugh MacMullan for technical support. Besanko and Doraszelski gratefully acknowledge
financial support from the National Science Foundation under Grant 0615615. The authors declare that they have
no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper.
†
Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.3.868 to visit the article page for additional materials and author
disclosure statement(s).
1
Edlin (2002) provides a comprehensive overview of the current law on predatory pricing. Bolton, Brodley, and
Riordan (2000) and Edlin (2012) provide excellent reviews of the theoretical and empirical literature.
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Characterizing predatory pricing is especially complicated when firms face other
intertemporal trade-offs such as learning-by-doing, network effects, or switching
costs that can give rise to aggressive pricing with subsequent recoupment.2 The
empirical literature, in particular, provides ample evidence that the marginal cost of
production decreases with cumulative experience in a variety of industrial settings,3
and the resulting tension between predatory pricing and mere competition for efficiency on a learning curve often comes to the fore when predation is alleged. It was,
for example, a key issue in the policy debate about the “semiconductor wars” between
the United States and Japan during the 1970s and 1980s (Flamm 1993, 1996; Dick
1991). Similarly, the predatory pricing that US color television producers accused
Japanese producers of during the 1960s and 1970s may have reflected a strategy of
acquiring competitive advantage by exploiting learning economies (Yamamura and
Vandenberg 1986). The European Commission case against Intel in 2009 over the
use of loyalty reward payments to computer manufacturers (that lead to a recordbreaking fine of $1.5 billion) likewise revolved around whether Intel’s behavior was
exclusionary or efficiency enhancing (Willig, Orszag, and Levin 2009).4
While predatory pricing is difficult to disentangle from pricing aggressively to
pursue efficiency, being able to do so is important in legal cases involving alleged
predation. Moreover, if one entertains the possibility that predatory pricing is a
viable business strategy, then a characterization of predatory pricing is required to
allow economists, legal scholars, and antitrust practitioners to detect its presence
and measure its extent.
The purpose of this paper is to formally characterize predatory pricing in a modern industry-dynamics framework along the lines of Ericson and Pakes (1995). To
this end, we develop a dynamic pricing model with endogenous competitive advantage and industry structure. The model is general enough to embrace a number of
specific applications including learning-by-doing, network effects, switching costs,
dynamic demand, and certain types of adjustment costs. As an illustration of our
general model, we focus on learning-by-doing as a special case.
We ask three interrelated questions. First, what drives pricing and, specifically,
how can we separate predatory incentives for pricing aggressively from efficiencyenhancing incentives? Second, when does predation-like behavior arise? Third,
what is the impact of the predatory incentives on industry structure, conduct, and
performance?
What Drives Pricing?—Unlike much of the previous literature, we do not attempt
to deliver an ironclad definition of predation. Instead, our contribution is to show
that we can isolate a firm’s predatory incentives by analytically decomposing the
2
This point has been made previously by Farrell and Katz (2005, p. 204): “Distinguishing competition from predation is even harder in network markets than in others. With intertemporal increasing returns, there may innocently
be intense initial competition as firms fight to make initial sales and benefit from the increasing returns.”
3
See the references in footnote 2 of Besanko et al. (2010).
4
For example, Intel CEO Paul Otellini argued “[w]e have however, … consistently invested in innovation, in
manufacturing and in developing leadership technology. The result is that we can discount our products to compete
in a highly competitive marketplace, passing along to consumers everywhere the efficiencies of being the world’s
leading volume manufacturer of microprocessors.” Andrew Nusca, “EC: Intel ‘Abused Dominant Position’ vs
AMD; Fined Record $1.45 Billion in Antitrust Case,” Between the Lines (blog), ZDNet, May 13, 2009, http://www.
zdnet.com/blog/btl/ec-intel-abused-dominant-position-vs-amd-fined-record-145-billion-in-antitrust-case/17884
(accessed June 7, 2011).
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equilibrium pricing condition. Our decomposition is reminiscent of that of Ordover
and Saloner (1989) but extends to the complex strategic interactions that arise in the
Markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic stochastic game.
The cornerstone of our decomposition is the insight that, in a dynamic pricing
model with endogenous competitive advantage and industry structure, the price set
by a firm reflects two goals besides short-run profit. First, by pricing aggressively, the
firm may improve its competitive position in the future, giving rise to what we call
the advantage-building motive. Second, the firm may prevent its rival from becoming a more formidable competitor, giving rise to the advantage-denying motive.
Our decomposition corresponds to the common practice of antitrust authorities
to question the intent behind a business strategy: Is the firm’s aggressive pricing
behavior primarily driven by the benefits of acquiring competitive advantage or by
the benefits from preventing the rival from acquiring competitive advantage or overcoming competitive disadvantage? The advantage-building motive maps into the
first set of benefits and the advantage-denying motive into the second set.
Due to its prominent role in predation cases, we examine learning-by-doing in
more detail in a model similar to those in Cabral and Riordan (1994) and Besanko
et al. (2010). Decomposing the equilibrium pricing condition with even more
granularity reveals that the probability that the rival exits the industry—the linchpin of any notion of predatory pricing—affects both the advantage-building and
advantage-denying motives. One component of the advantage-building motive is the
advantage-building/exit motive. This is the marginal benefit to the firm from the
increase in the probability of rival exit that results if the firm moves further down its
learning curve. Similarly, the advantage-denying/exit motive is the marginal benefit
from preventing the decrease in the probability of rival exit that results if the rival
moves further down its learning curve.
Our decomposition provides us with a coherent and flexible way to define a firm’s
predatory pricing incentives. Although our three alternative definitions are motivated
by the existing literature, they draw the line between predatory pricing and mere
competition for efficiency on a learning curve in different places. Indeed, our decomposition makes clear that there is much latitude in where exactly to draw this line.
When Does Predation-Like Behavior Arise?—While there is a sizeable literature
that attempts to rationalize predatory pricing as an equilibrium phenomenon by means
of reputation effects (Kreps et al. 1982), informational asymmetries (Fudenberg and
Tirole 1986), or financial constraints (Bolton and Sharfstein 1990), our learning-bydoing model forgoes these features and “stacks the deck” against predatory pricing.
Our numerical analysis nevertheless reveals the widespread existence of equilibria
involving behavior that resembles conventional notions of predatory pricing in the
sense that aggressive pricing in the short run is associated with reduced competition in
the long run. The fact that predation-like behavior arises routinely and without requiring extreme or unusual parameterizations calls into question the idea that economic
theory provides prima facie evidence that predatory pricing is a rare phenomenon.
Our paper relates to earlier work by Cabral and Riordan (1994), who establish analytically the possibility that predation-like behavior can arise in a model
of learning-by-doing, and Snider (2008), who uses the Ericson and Pakes (1995)
framework to explore whether American Airlines engaged in predatory capacity
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expansion in the Dallas-Fort Worth to Wichita market in the late 1990s. We go
beyond establishing possibility by way of an example or a case study and show just
how common predation-like behavior is.
We also reinforce and formalize a point made by Edlin (2012, p. 147) that predatory pricing is common “if business folk think so.” Equilibria involving predation-like behavior often coexist in our model with equilibria involving much less
aggressive pricing. Multiple equilibria arise in our model if, for given demand and
cost fundamentals, there is more than one set of firms’ expectations regarding the
value of continued play that is consistent with rational expectations about equilibrium behavior and industry dynamics.5 Which of these equilibria is realized depends
on firms’ expectations. Loosely speaking, if firms anticipate that predatory pricing
may work, they have an incentive to choose the extremely aggressive prices that, in
turn, ensure that predatory pricing does work. Guiding firms’ expectations regarding
the evolution of the industry can thus be a powerful tool for antitrust policy.
In providing a formal connection between predatory pricing and multiple equilibria, our paper relates to independent work by Shalem, Spiegel, and Stahl (2011).
Their model admits an equilibrium in which a strong firm prices aggressively to
drive a weak firm out of the market and another equilibrium in which the strong firm
accommodates its current competitor as well as all subsequent entrants. In contrast
to our model, competitive advantage is exogenous in their model and aggressive
pricing is predatory by default (as it cannot improve a firm’s competitive position).
What Is the Impact of Predatory Incentives?—While much of the previous literature has argued for—or against—the merits of particular definitions of predation on
conceptual grounds, we directly measure the impact of a firm’s predatory pricing
incentives (according to the various definitions) on industry structure, conduct, and
performance. We do so by computing equilibria of a counterfactual game in which
firms ignore the predatory incentives in setting their prices and comparing them to
equilibria of the actual game across a wide range of parameterizations.
Ignoring the advantage-building/exit and advantage-denying/exit motives in line
with our narrowest definition of predatory incentives has on average a smaller impact
on industry structure, conduct, and performance than ignoring the advantage-building
and advantage-denying motives in their entirety in line with our broadest definition
of predatory incentives. Ignoring more broadly defined predatory incentives has a
larger impact because it eliminates equilibria with predation-like behavior, paving
the way for lower concentration and prices and higher consumer and total surplus in
the long run. In contrast, it causes little change in equilibria involving less aggressive pricing.
Our analysis further reveals a tension between reducing predation-like behavior
and reducing the intense competition for the market that gives rise to high levels of
consumer surplus in the short run. Indeed, the price of making future consumers
better off is often to make current consumers worse off. The price to be paid can be
very steep for the broadest definition of predatory incentives.
5
Multiple equilibria can potentially also arise in our model if the best replies of the one-shot game that is being
played given continuation values intersect more than once. This cannot happen in the model in Besanko et al.
(2010).
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I. Model

Because predatory pricing is an inherently dynamic phenomenon, we consider a
discrete-time, infinite-horizon dynamic stochastic game between two firms. We first
lay out a general dynamic pricing model with endogenous competitive advantage and
industry structure that gives rise to an advantage-building and an a dvantage-denying
motive and then tailor the model to an industry with learning-by-doing.
A. Setup
At any point in time, firm n ∈ {1, 2} is described by its state en∈ {0, 1, … , M }.
A firm in state en= 0 is a potential entrant, and a firm in state e n∈ {1, … , M } is
an incumbent firm that competes in the product market and jostles for competitive
advantage. State e n∈ {1, … , M } is the competitive position of incumbent firm n
and indicates the level of a valuable firm-specific resource such as a cost or demand
advantage. In an industry with learning-by-doing, for example, state en∈ {1, … , M }
indicates the cumulative experience or stock of know-how of incumbent firm n
which, in turn, determines its production cost. With network effects or switching
costs, it indicates the installed base or the number of captive customers.
The industry’s state is the vector of firms’ states e = (e1, e2) ∈ {0, 1, … , M }2. In
each period, firms first set prices and then decide on exit and entry. During the
price-setting phase the industry’s state changes from e to e′ depending on the pricing decisions of the incumbent firms. During the exit-entry phase, the state further
changes from e′ to e″ depending on the exit decisions of the incumbent firms and the
entry decisions of the potential entrants. The state at the end of the current period
finally becomes the state at the beginning of the subsequent period.
Product Market and Competitive Advantage.—As incumbent firm n competes in
the product market, its profit in the current period is π
 n(p, e) given the vector of
firms’ prices p = ( p1, p2) and the industry’s state e.6
Besides competing in the product market, incumbent firm n adjusts its price in the
current period to influence the industry’s state in the subsequent period. Competitive
advantage is therefore determined endogenously. Specifically, we model the probability that the industry’s state changes from e to e′ during the price-setting phase
as Pr ( e′ | e, q ) given the vector q = (q1, q2) and the industry’s state e, where qn
= Dn(p, e) is itself a function of prices p and the industry’s state e. It is natural to
think of q as (realized or expected) quantities or market shares and of Dn( · ) as the
demand function of incumbent firm n, but q can actually be anything resulting from
the pricing decisions of the incumbent firms such as the probability of making a sale
or the profit from competing in the product market.
Exit and Entry.—We model entry as a transition from state e  ′n  = 0 to state e  ′′n  = 1
and exit as a transition from state e  ′n  ≥ 1 to state e  ′′n  = 0 so that the exit of an

6

To conserve on notation, we take the price of a potential entrant to be infinity.

VOL. 104 NO. 3

besanko et al.: the economics of predation

873

i ncumbent firm creates an opportunity for a new firm to enter the industry. Re-entry
is therefore possible.
If incumbent firm n exits the industry, it receives a scrap
 n drawn from
_ value_X
[
(

·
)
with
support

X 

−
Δ


,

 
X 
+ ΔX   ], where
a symmetric
triangular
distribution
F


X
X
_
 and Δ
 X > 0 is a scale parameter. If potential entrant n enters the indusEX(Xn) = X 
triangular distribution F
 S( · )
try, it incurs a _setup cost
 n drawn from a symmetric
_ S
_
[
]
 − ΔS , S  + ΔS   , where E
 S(Sn) = S 
 and ΔS> 0 is a scale parameter.
with support S 
Scrap values and setup costs are independently and identically distributed across
firms and periods, and their realization is observed by the firm but not its rival.
B. Firms’ Decisions
To analyze the pricing and exit decisions of incumbent firms and the entry decision of a potential entrant, we work backwards from the exit-entry phase to the
price-setting phase. Because scrap values and setup costs are private to a firm, its
rival remains uncertain about the firm’s decision. Combining exit and entry decisions, we let ϕn(e′  ) denote the probability, as viewed from the perspective of its
rival, that firm n decides not to operate in state e′.
We let V
 n(e) denote the expected net present value (NPV) of future cash flows to
firm n in state e at the beginning of the period and U
 n(e′  ) the expected NPV of future
cash flows to firm n in state e′ after pricing decisions but before exit and entry decisions are made. The price-setting phase determines the value function V
 n(e) along
with the policy function pn(e); the exit-entry phase determines the value function
 n(e′  ).
Un(e′  ) along with the policy function ϕ
Exit Decision of Incumbent Firm.—To simplify the exposition, we focus on
firm 1; the derivations for firm 2 are analogous. If incumbent firm 1 exits the industry, it receives the scrap value X
 1in the current period and perishes. If it does not
exit, its expected NPV is
X 1  (e′  ) = β [ V1  (e′  )( 1 − ϕ2   (e′  )) + V1  (e  ′1,  0) ϕ2   (e′  ) ],
 	ˆ
where β ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor. Incumbent firm 1’s decision to exit the indusX 1(e′  ) ], where 1[ · ] is the indicator function
try in state e′ is thus ϕ
 1(e′, X1) = 1[ X1  ≥ ˆ
ˆ
and  X 1(e′  ) the critical level of the scrap value above which exit occurs. The prob X (ˆ
 X 1(e′  )), and before incumability of incumbent firm 1 exiting is ϕ1(e′  ) = 1 − F
bent firm 1 observes its draw of the scrap value, its expected NPV is given by the
Bellman equation,
 X 1(e′  ), X1  }  ]
(1)  
U1  (e′  ) = EX [ max { ˆ
= ( 1 − ϕ1   (e′  )) β [ V1  (e′  )( 1 − ϕ2   (e′  )) + V1  (e  ′1,  0) ϕ2   (e′  ) ]
 X [ X1| X1  ≥ ˆ
X 1  (e′  ) ],
+ ϕ1  (e′  )E
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where EX[ X1| X1  ≥ ˆ
X 1(e′  ) ]is the expectation of the scrap value conditional on exiting the industry.
Entry Decision of Potential Entrant.—If potential entrant 1 does not enter the
industry, it perishes. If it enters and becomes an incumbent firm (in the initial state 1)
in the subsequent period, its expected NPV is
S 1(e′  ) = β [ V1  (1, e  ′2)  ( 1 − ϕ2   (e′  )) + V1  (1, 0) ϕ2   (e′  ) ].
 	ˆ

In addition, it incurs the setup cost S 1in the current period. Potential entrant 1’s
S 1(e′  ) ], where
decision to not enter the industry in state e′ is thus ϕ
 1(e′, S1) = 1[ S1  ≥ ˆ
ˆ
 S 1(e′  ) is the critical level of the setup cost. The probability of potential entrant 1 not
 S(ˆ
 S 1(e′  )), and before potential entrant 1 observes its draw
entering is ϕ1(e′  ) = 1 − F
of the setup cost, its expected NPV is given by the Bellman equation
 S 1  (e′  ) − S1, 0 }  ]
(2)  
U1  (e′  ) = ES   [ max { ˆ

= ( 1 − ϕ1   (e′  )) { β [ V1  (1, e  ′2)  ( 1 − ϕ2   (e′  )) + V1  (1, 0) ϕ2   (e′  ) ]
− ES [ S1| S1  ≤ ˆ
S 1  (e′  ) ]  }  ,

where ES[ S1| S1  ≤ ˆ
S 1(e′  ) ]is the expectation of the setup cost conditional on entering
7
the industry.
Pricing Decision of Incumbent Firm.—In the price-setting phase, the expected
NPV of incumbent firm 1 is
 π1  ( p1, p2  (e), e)
(3)  V1  (e) = max
p 
1

+ 
∑  U
 1(e′  ) Pr ( e′ | e, D1  ( p1, p2  (e), e), D2  ( p1, p2  (e), e)).
e′  

Because ∑
   e′    Pr ( e′ | e, q )= 1, we can formulate the maximization problem on the
right-hand side of the Bellman equation (3) as maxp1  Π1( p1, p2(e), e), where
(4)  
Π
U1(e)+ 
∑  [ U1  (e′  ) − U1  (e) ] 
1  ( p
1, p
2  (e), e) = π1   ( p
1, p
2  (e), e) + 
e′  ≠e

× Pr ( e′ | e, D1  ( p1, p2  (e), e), D2  ( p1, p2  (e), e)) 
is the long-run profit of incumbent firm 1. The first-order condition for the pricing
decision p1(e) of incumbent firm 1 is
7

See the online Appendix for closed-form expressions for 
EX [ X1| X1   ≥ ˆ
X 1 (e′  ) ] in equation (1) and

ES [ S1| S1   ≤ ˆ
S 1 (e′  ) ]in equation (2).
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∂ π1   ( p1, p2  (e), e)
(5) 0 = _
   

∂ p1

∂ Pr ( e′ | e, D1  ( p1, p2  (e), e), D2  ( p1, p2  (e), e)) ∂ D1  ( p1, p2  (e), e)
+ ∑   [ U1(e′  ) − U
 1(e) ]   ___
    
  _
    
∂ q1

e′  ≠e

∂ p1

∂ Pr ( e′ | e, D1  ( p1, p2  (e), e), D2  ( p1, p2(e), e)) ∂ ( −D2  )( p1, p2  (e), e)

__,
___
+ ∑   [ U
 1(e) − U
 1(e′  ) ]      
 
       
e ′  ≠e

∂ q2

∂ p1

where in the last line we take the derivative of (−D2)( p1, p2(e)) instead of
D2( p1, p2(e)) with respect to p 1to make the sign comparable to that of the derivative
of D1( p1, p2(e)).
The pricing decision p 1(e) of incumbent firm 1 is akin to an investment decision in
that it encompasses its short-run profit π
 1( p1, p2(e), e) and its long-run competitive
position vis-à-vis that of its rival. Competitive advantage changes as the industry’s
state changes. Equation (5) shows that the firm’s price p1affects the transitions in
the industry’s state from e to e′ through two distinct channels: first, through the
impact that p 1has on the firm’s quantity q1and, second, through the impact that
p1has on its rival’s quantity q 2. We call the first channel the advantage-building
motive and the second channel the advantage-denying motive. Loosely speaking,
the advantage-building motive captures the idea that a lower price p 1may—by way
of a higher quantity q 1—change the industry’s state in a way that is more favorable
to incumbent firm 1. The advantage-denying motive captures the idea that a lower
price p1may—by way of a lower quantity q2 —prevent the industry’s state from
changing in a way that is less favorable to incumbent firm 1.
C. Key Assumptions and Applications
The advantage-building and the advantage-denying motive arise because of two
key assumptions. First, whereas the literature on dynamic stochastic games (see,
e.g., Filar and Vrieze 1997; Başar and Olsder 1999) specifies the transition probabilities Pr ( e′ | e, p )to depend directly on players’ actions (in our case, firms’ prices
p), we restrict the transition probabilities Pr ( e′ | e, q ) to depend on p through the
demand system q 1  = D1(p, e) and q2  = D2(p, e).
Our second assumption is that firms set prices, not quantities. With
quantity-setting, the long-run profit of incumbent firm 1 is
 	Π1  (q1, q2  (e), e) = π1   (P1  (q1, q2  (e), e), P2  (q1, q2  (e), e), e) + U1  (e)
+ ∑  [ U1  (e′  ) − U1  (e) ]Pr ( e′ | e, q1, q2(e)),
e′  ≠e

where p 1  = P1(q, e) and p2  = P2(q, e) is the inverse demand system. The corresponding first-order condition shows that the advantage-denying motive disappears
because, in contrast to the firm’s price, the firm’s quantity has no direct effect on its
rival’s quantity.

876

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

march 2014

Within the confines of these assumptions, the general model has many applications, including the models of learning-by-doing in Cabral and Riordan (1994) and
Besanko et al. (2010). The models of network effects in Mitchell and Skrzypacz
(2006); Chen, Doraszelski, and Harrington (2009); Dube, Hitsch, and Chintagunta
(2010); and Cabral (2011), and the model of habit formation in Bergemann and
Välimäki (2006) are closely related, as are the models of switching costs in Dube,
Hitsch, and Rossi (2009) and Chen (2011).
More generally, in models of dynamic demand the sales in the current period determine the state of demand in the subsequent period. To the extent that firms compete
for sales, a firm’s price thus affects its rival’s competitive position, and this gives rise
to an advantage-denying motive. Demand may be dynamic in markets with durable goods (Goettler and Gordon 2011; Gowrisankaran and Rysman 2012), storable
goods (Erdem, Imai, and Keane 2003; Hendel and Nevo 2006), and experience goods
(Bergemann and Välimäki 1996; Ching 2010). A difference with our general model is
that consumers are typically forward-looking in models of dynamic demand.
Price-setting models with costly quantity—or capacity—adjustment are another
application of our general model, as are—perhaps more surprisingly—quantitysetting models with costly price adjustments (menu costs). This is because in these
latter models a firm’s quantity has a direct effect on its rival’s price in the current
period and thus competitive position in the subsequent period (see Lapham and
Ware 1994 and Jun and Vives 2004 and the references therein). On the other hand,
neither price-setting models with costly price adjustment nor quantity-setting models with costly quantity adjustment give rise to an advantage-denying motive.
Finally, some investment models, such as advertising models where goodwill accumulates according to a firm’s “share of voice” or advertising is combative, give rise
to an advantage-denying motive (see Jorgensen and Zaccour 2004 and the references
therein). More generally, the advantage-denying motive is present whenever a firm’s
investment directly and immediately spills over into its rival’s competitive position.
D. Learning-by-Doing
Because learning-by-doing is important in many industries where allegations of
predation have surfaced in the past, we use it as an illustrative example to gain further insights into how the advantage-building and the advantage-denying motives
operate and can be used to develop alternative characterizations of a firm’s predatory
pricing incentives. Our learning-by-doing model is closely related to Cabral and
Riordan (1994) and Besanko et al. (2010) but is more general by allowing for exit
and entry. Unlike Besanko et al. (2010), we abstract from organizational forgetting.8
Learning-by-Doing and Production Cost.—State en∈ {1, … , M } indicates the
cumulative experience or stock of know-how of incumbent firm n. Its marginal cost
of production c(en) is given by
8
Empirical studies show that organizations can forget the know-how gained through learning-by-doing due to
labor turnover, periods of inactivity, and failure to institutionalize tacit knowledge (Argote, Beckman, and Epple
1990; Darr, Argote, and Epple 1995; Benkard 2000; Shafer, Nembhard, and Uzumeri 2001; Thompson 2007).
Besanko et al. (2010) show that organizational forgetting predisposes firms to price aggressively. Omitting organizational forgetting from the model therefore “stacks the deck” against finding predation-like behavior.
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⎧ κρ log2en  if 1 ≤ e < m,
n
⎪
c (en) = ⎨
⎪ κρ log2m if m ≤ e  ≤ M,
n
⎩
where κ > 0 is the marginal cost for a firm without prior experience, and ρ ∈ [0, 1]
is the progress ratio. Marginal cost decreases by 100(1 − ρ) percent as the stock of
know-how doubles, so a lower progress ratio implies a steeper learning curve.
An emerging firm is at the top of its learning curve in state en= 1. As the firm
makes sales, it adds to its stock of know-how and lowers its production cost in subsequent periods. Once the firm reaches state en= m, the learning curve “bottoms out.” A
mature firm in state em≥ m thus enjoys no further experience-based cost reductions.9
Demand.—The industry draws customers from a large pool of potential buyers.
In each period, one buyer enters the market and purchases one unit of either one of
the “inside goods” that are offered by the incumbent firms at prices p or an “outside good” at an exogenously given price p 0. The probability that incumbent firm n
makes the sale is given by the logit specification

(

)

(

)

υ − pn
−pn
exp  _
exp   _
  σ   
   
σ
    =  __
   ,
(6) 	qn = Dn  (p) =  __
  
  
  
  
2
2
υ
− 
p

−pk

k
_
_
∑  exp    σ   
   exp    σ   
∑
k=0
k=0

(

)

(

)

where υ is gross utility, and σ > 0 is a scale parameter that governs the degree of
product differentiation. As σ → 0, goods become homogeneous.
Pricing Decision of Incumbent Firm.—The learning-by-doing model is a special
case of the general model with the probability that the industry’s state changes from
e to e′ during the price-setting phase set to
⎧
q 1
if e′ = (e1  + 1, e2),
⎪
if e′ = (e1, e2  + 1),
q2
Pr ( e′ | e, q ) = ⎨
⎪ 1 − q1  − q2 if e′ = e,
⎩

where qn is the probability that incumbent firm n makes the sale as given in
equation (6). The long-run profit of incumbent firm 1 in equation (4) accordingly
simplifies to
  ( p1, p2  (e), e) = ( p1  − c (e1)) D1  ( p1, p2(e)) + U1  (e)
(7)  
Π1

+ D1 ( p1, p2(e))[ U1  (e1  + 1, e2) − U1  (e) ]
+ D2 ( p1, p2(e))[ U1  (e1, e2  + 1) − U1  (e) ].

We obviously have to ensure en ≤ M. To simplify the exposition we abstract from boundary issues in what
follows.
9
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Because Π1( p1, p2(e), e) is strictly quasiconcave in p1 (given p 2(e) and e), the pricing decision p 1(e) is uniquely determined by a first-order condition analogous to
equation (5):
(8)  mr1 ( p1, p2  (e)) − c (e1) + [ U1  (e1  + 1, e2) − U1  (e) ]

	  + ϒ ( p2  (e))[ U1  (e) − U1  (e1, e2  + 1) ] = 0,

σ
  
 is the marginal revenue of incumbent
where mr1(p1, p2(e)) = p1  −  _
1 − D(p, p(e))
1

1

2

firm 1, or what Edlin (2012) calls inclusive price,10 and

2
1 2
p  (e)
   
 _
D2 ( p1, p2(e))
exp ( − _
  2σ   )
∂ p1
 = __
 	ϒ ( p2(e))=  __
  
  
   
    = __
  
      
∂ D1 ( p1, p2(e))
p  (e)
p
1 − D1 ( p1, p2(e)) exp ( − _
_
   

  σ0   )+ exp ( − _
  2σ   )
∂ p

∂ (−D)( p, p(e))

1

is the probability of firm 2 making a sale conditional on firm 1 not making a sale.11
Equation (8) decomposes the equilibrium pricing condition by isolating the
two distinct channels through which the firm’s price p1affects the transitions in
the industry’s state from e to e′ in the learning-by-doing model. First, by winning the sale in the current period, the firm moves further down its learning curve
and improves its future competitive position. The reward that the firm thereby
receives is the advantage-building motive 
[ U1(e1  + 1, e2) − U1(e) ]. Second,
by winning the sale in the current period, the firm prevents its rival from moving down its learning curve and becoming a more formidable competitor in the
future. The penalty that the firm thereby avoids is the advantage-denying motive
[ U1(e) − U1(e1, e2  + 1) ].
Predatory Incentives.—To detect the presence of predatory pricing, antitrust
authorities ask whether a firm sacrifices current profit in exchange for the expectation
of higher future profit following the exit of a rival. This sacrifice test views predatory
pricing as an “investment in monopoly profit” (Bork 1978). As Edlin and Farrell
(2004, p. 510) point out, “in practice sacrifice tests often use short-run data,” thus
equating predatory pricing with a failure to maximize short-run profit ( p1  − c(e1))
× D1( p1, p2(e)). This view implies that the firm’s predatory pricing incentives are its
dynamic incentives in their entirety:
Definition 1 (Short-Run Profit): The firm’s predatory pricing incentives are
[ U1(e1  + 1, e2) − U1(e) ]+ ϒ(p2(e))[ U1(e) − U1(e1, e2  + 1) ].
Because mr1( p1, p2(e)) is strictly increasing in p1, equation (8) implies that any
increase in the advantage-building or the advantage-denying motive makes the firm
10

See the online Appendix for details.
To ensure that the various terms in equation (8) are expressed in monetary units we have rescaled equation
(5) by
∂ Pr ( e1   + 1, e2 | e, D1  ( p1 , p2   (e)), D2  ( p1 , p2   (e)))   ∂ D1 ( p1 , p2  (e))
1
 ____
     
   
   __
  
   = −  _
σ  D1 ( p1, p2  (e))( 1 − D1  ( p1, p2  (e)))  .
∂ q1 
∂ p1
11
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more aggressive in pricing. If an improvement in the firm’s competitive p osition
is beneficial or an improvement in the rival’s competition position is harmful
so that [ U1(e1 + 1, e2) − U1(e) ] + ϒ( p2(e))[ U1(e) − U1(e1, e2 + 1) ] > 0, then
mr1( p1, p2(e)) < c(e1) and the firm charges a price below the static optimum, thereby
sacrificing current profit. Price may even be below marginal cost if the advantagebuilding or the advantage-denying motive is sufficiently large.12
Definition 1 is closely related to the classic Areeda and Turner (1975) test
that equates predatory pricing with below-cost pricing and underpins the current
Brooke Group standard for predatory pricing in the United States. Indeed, because
mr1( p1, p2(e)) → p 1 as σ → 0, in an industry with weak horizontal differentiation
[ U1(e1  + 1, e2) − U1(e) ]+ ϒ( p2(e))[ U1(e) − U1(e1, e2  + 1) ]> 0 nearly implies
p1  < c(e1).
Definition 1 may be too broad as it denies the efficiency gains from pricing
aggressively in order to move down the learning curve by forcing a static model of
profit maximization onto a dynamic world. Farrell and Katz (2005) argue forcefully that an action is predatory to the extent that it weakens the rival (see, in
particular, p. 219 and p. 226). A firm should behave as if it were operating in a
“dynamic competitive vacuum” in the sense that the firm takes as given the competitive position of its rival in the current period but ignores that its current price
can affect the evolution of the competitive position of its rival beyond the current period. An alternative definition of predatory incentives thus centers on the
advantage-denying motive:
Definition 2 (Dynamic Competitive Vacuum): The firm’s predatory pricing
incentives are [ U1(e) − U1(e1, e2  + 1) ].
Definition 2 disentangles predatory incentives from standard dynamic pricing incentives under learning-by-doing that can lead even a monopolist to set inclusive price
below marginal cost.
In contrast to Definitions 1 and 2, the economic definitions of predation formulated in the literature focus more narrowly on the impact of a price cut on rival
exit. According to Ordover and Willig (1981, pp. 9–10), “[ p]redatory behavior is
a response to a rival that sacrifices part of the profit that could be earned under
competitive circumstances were the rival to remain viable, in order to induce exit
and gain consequent additional monopoly profit.” Cabral and Riordan (1997,
p.160) relatedly call “an action predatory if (i) a different action would increase
the probability that rivals remain viable and (ii) the different action would be
more profitable under the counterfactual hypothesis that the rival’s viability were
unaffected.”
In our dynamic stochastic game we take the “rival’s viability” to refer to the probability that the rival exits the industry in the current period. Using equation (1),
we decompose the advantage-building and the advantage-denying motive further
12
The value function U1(e) is endogenously determined in equilibrium and, for some parameterizations, these
motives fail to be positive. For example, if the industry moves into a state with aggressive price competition as
the firm wins the sale, then we may have U
 1 (e1   + 1, e2 ) < U1 (e) and we may have U
 1(e) < U1 (e1 , e2   + 1) if the
industry moves out of such a state as the rival wins the sale; see Section 6.1 of Besanko et al. (2010) for details.
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−REX
as [U1(e1  + 1, e2) − U1(e) ]= [ Γ  REX
(e) ] and [U1(e) − U
 1(e1, e2  + 1) ]
1  (e) + Γ  1 
REX
−REX
REX
 1 (e) isolate the impact of a price
= [ Θ  1  (e) + Θ  1  (e) ], where Γ  1  (e) and Θ  REX
cut on rival exit.13 In particular, the advantage-building/exit motive

 1 − ϕ1   (e))[ ϕ2 (e1  + 1, e2) − ϕ2 (e) ]  β[ V1(e1  + 1, 0) − V1(e1  + 1, e2) ]
 	Γ  REX
1    (e) = (
is the marginal benefit to the firm from increasing its rival’s exit probability from
ϕ2(e) to ϕ2(e1  + 1, e2). The increase in the firm’s expected NPV, [V1(e1  + 1, 0) −
V1(e1  + 1, e2)], is deflated by the probability (1 − ϕ1 (e)) that the firm remains in the
industry in the current period because otherwise the benefit is nil. The advantagedenying/exit motive
 1 − ϕ1 (e))[ ϕ2 (e) − ϕ2 (e1, e2  + 1) ] β [ V1(e1, 0) − V1(e) ]
 	Θ  REX
1    (e) = (
is the marginal benefit to the firm from preventing its rival’s exit probability from
decreasing from ϕ2(e) to ϕ2(e1, e2  + 1). The increase in the firm’s expected NPV,
 1(e)], is again deflated by the probability (1 − ϕ1(e)) that the firm
[V1(e1, 0) − V
(e) and Θ  −REX
(e) in the decomposed
remains in the industry. The remainders Γ  −REX
1 
1 
advantage-building and advantage-denying motives capture the impact of the firm’s
pricing decision on its competitive position within the duopoly, its rival’s competitive position within the duopoly, and so on.
In the spirit of Ordover and Willig (1981) and Cabral and Riordan (1997), our
final and narrowest definition of predatory incentives is:
Definition 3 (Rival Exit): The firm’s predatory pricing incentives are
REX
   REX
Γ
1  (e) + ϒ( p2(e))Θ  1  (e).
II. Equilibrium and Computation

Because the demand and cost specification is symmetric, we restrict ourselves
to symmetric Markov perfect equilibria in pure strategies of our learning-by-doing
model.14 Existence follows from the arguments in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite
(2010). In a symmetric equilibrium, the decisions taken by firm 2 in state e = (e1, e2)
are identical to the decisions taken by firm 1 in state (e2, e1). It therefore suffices to
determine the value and policy functions of firm 1.
We use the homotopy or path-following method in Besanko et al. (2010) to compute the symmetric Markov perfect equilibria of our learning-by-doing model.
Although it cannot be guaranteed to find all equilibria, the advantage of this method
is its ability to explore the equilibrium correspondence and search for multiple equilibria in a systematic fashion.
13
This decomposition applies to an industry with two incumbent firms in state e ≥ (1, 1) and we focus on firm 1.
Because Γ
   REX
   REX
1  (e) and Θ
1  (e) are typically positive, we refer to them as marginal benefits. To streamline the
exposition, we further presume monotonicity of the value and policy functions. For some parameterizations these
assumptions fail.
14
The focus on symmetric equilibria does not imply that the industry inevitably evolves toward a symmetric
structure. Depending on how successful a firm is in moving down its learning curve, it may have a cost and charge
a price different from that of its rival.
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To explain the homotopy method, consider a single equation H(x, ω) = 0 in a
unknown variable x and a known parameter ω. To the extent that there is more than
one x that solves H(x, ω) = 0 given ω, the mapping H
 −1(ω) = { x | H(x, ω) = 0 }
from parameters into variables is a correspondence. We think of H(x, ω) = 0 as
the equilibrium condition and of H−1(ω) = { x | H(x, ω) = 0 }as the equilibrium
correspondence. This correspondence takes the form of one or more “paths” through
(x, ω)-space, and the homotopy method seeks to trace out these paths.
It does so by introducing an auxiliary variable s to define a parametric curve
(x(s), ω(s)) ∈ H
 −1
 (ω) = { x | H(x, ω) = 0 }. Differentiating H(x(s), ω(s)) = 0 with
∂H( x(s), ω(s))
∂H( x(s), ω(s))
respect to s yields  _
   x′(s) +  _
   ω′(s) = 0. Starting from a point
∂x

∂x

(x(s), ω(s)) on the path, this differential equation prescribes how x and ω must
change to obtain another point on the path. The homotopy method reduces the task
of solving the equation H(x, ω) = 0 to the task of solving this differential equation.
This requires an initial condition in the form of a known point on the path. If we do
not have an initial condition for a path in H
 −1(ω) = {(x, ω) | H(x, ω) = 0}, then we
may not be able to trace it out and will therefore miss some solutions to H(x, ω) = 0.
Computing the equilibria of our learning-by-doing model mirrors the above
example except that it involves many equilibrium conditions H(x, ω) = 0 (Bellman
equations and optimality conditions), many variables
x = (V1, U1, p1, ϕ1) (values
_
and policies), and many parameters ω = (ρ, σ, X , …).15 To explore the equilibrium
correspondence H−1(ω) = { x | H(x, ω) = 0 }, we compute slices of it by varying a
parameter of the model such as the progress ratio ρ while holding the remaining
parameters fixed. We denote a slice of the equilibrium correspondence along ρ by
H−1(ρ) in what follows.
To try and identify as many equilibria as possible, we proceed in an intuitively
appealing but potentially fallible way. Just as we can vary the progress ratio ρ while
holding the remaining parameters fixed, we can vary the degree of product differentiation σ while holding the remaining parameters fixed. We “crisscross” the parameter
space in an orderly fashion by using the equilibria on the ρ-slices as initial conditions to generate σ-slices. A σ-slice must either intersect with all ρ-slices or lead us
to an additional equilibrium that, in turn, gives us an initial condition to generate an
additional ρ-slice. We continue this process until all σ- and ρ-slices “match up.” We
denote the resulting two-dimensional slice through the equilibrium correspondence
by H
 −1(_ρ, σ). We employ
_ the same procedure to obtain two-dimensional slices
−1
 −1(σ, X ). This gives us three intersecting two-dimensional slices
H (ρ, X ) and H
that we use to explore the economic significance of predatory incentives.
To compute a slice through the equilibrium correspondence along one or more
parameters of interest, we hold the remaining parameters fixed at the values in
Table 1. While this baseline parameterization is not intended to be representative of
any particular industry, it is neither entirely unrepresentative nor extreme.

See Besanko et al. (2010) and Borkovsky, Doraszelski, and Kryukov (2010, 2012) for details. Our codes are
available upon request.
15
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Table 1—Baseline Parameterization
Parameter

Value

Maximum stock of know-how M
Price of outside good p0
Gross utility υ
Product differentiation σ
Cost at top of learning curve κ
Bottom of learning curve m
Progress ratio
_ρ
Scrap value_X 
 , ΔX 
Setup cost S 
 , ΔS
Discount factor β

30
10
10
1
10
15
0.75
1.5, 1.5
4.5, 1.5
0.9524

III. Predation-Like Behavior

To illustrate the types of behavior that can emerge in our learning-by-doing model,
we examine the equilibria that arise for the baseline parameterization in Table 1. For
two of these three equilibria Figure 1 shows the pricing decision of firm 1, the nonoperating probability of firm 2, and the time path of the probability distribution over
industry structures (empty, monopoly, and duopoly).16
The upper panels of Figure 1 exemplify what we call an aggressive equilibrium.
The pricing decision in the upper left panel exhibits a deep well in state (1, 1) with
p1(1, 1) = −34.78. A well is a preemption battle where firms vie to be the first to
move down from the top of their learning curves. The pricing decision further exhibits a deep trench along the e1-axis with p1(e1, 1) ranging from 0.08 to 1.24 for e
1  ∈ {2, … , 30}.17 A trench is a price war that the leader (firm 1) wages against the
follower (firm 2). One can think of a trench as an endogenously arising mobility
barrier in the sense of Caves and Porter (1977). In the trench the follower exits the
industry with a positive probability of ϕ2(e1, 1) = 0.22 for e 1   ∈ {2, … , 30} as the
upper middle panel shows. The follower remains in this exit zone as long as it does
not win a sale. Once the follower exits, the leader raises its price and the industry
becomes an entrenched monopoly.18 This sequence of events resembles conventional notions of predatory pricing. The industry may also evolve into a mature
duopoly if the follower manages to crash through the mobility barrier by winning
a sale but, as the upper right panel of Figure 1 shows, this is far less likely than an
entrenched monopoly.
The lower panels of Figure 1 are typical for an accommodative equilibrium. There is
a shallow well in state (1, 1) with p1(1, 1) = 5.05 as the lower left panel shows. Without
mobility barriers in the form of trenches, however, any competitive advantage is temporary and the industry evolves into a mature duopoly as the lower right panel shows.
To further illustrate how industry dynamics differ between the aggressive and
 1for a particular
accommodative equilibria, we use the policy functions p1and ϕ
equilibrium to construct the matrix of state-to-state transition probabilities that
16

The third equilibrium is essentially intermediate between the two shown in Figure 1.
Because prices are strategic complements, there is also a shallow trench along the e 2 -axis with p 1 (1, e2 ) ranging from 3.63 to 4.90 for e2   ∈ {2, … , 30}.
18
While our model allows for re-entry, whether it actually occurs depends on how a potential entrant assesses its
prospects in the industry. In this particular equilibrium, ϕ
 2 (e1 , 0) = 1.00 for e 1   ∈ {2, … , 30}, so that the potential
entrant does not enter if the incumbent firm has moved down from the top of its learning curve.
17
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Figure 1. Aggressive and Accomodative Equilibria
Notes: Pricing decision of firm 1 (left panels), nonoperating probability of firm 2 (middle panels), and time path of
probability distribution over industry structures, starting from e = (1, 1) at T = 0 (right panels). Aggressive (upper
panels) and accommodative (lower panels) equilibria.

c haracterizes the Markov process of industry dynamics. From this, we compute the
transient distribution over states in period T, μ
 T, starting from state (1, 1) in period 0.
Depending on T, the transient distributions can capture short-run or long-run
(steady-state) dynamics. We think of period 1,000 as the long run and, with a
 . We use the transient distribution in
slight abuse of notation, denote μ
 1,000by μ∞
period 1,000 rather than the limiting (or ergodic) distribution to capture long-run
dynamics because the Markov process implied by the equilibrium under consideration may have multiple closed communicating classes.19
19
The vast majority of equilibria that we have computed has either one or two closed communicating classes. If
there is one, it typically is a mature duopoly; if there are two, they are a mature monopoly and a mature duopoly.
The multiple closed communicating classes that arise for a particular equilibrium are conceptually different from
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Table 2—Most Likely Industry Structure, Pricing Decisions, And Nonoperating Probabilities
Aggressive equilibrium
T

e

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
20
50
∞

(1, 1)
(2, 1)
(3, 1)
(4, 1)
(5, 0)
(6, 0)
(7, 0)
(8, 0)
(9, 0)
(9, 0)
(10, 0)
(18, 0)
(30, 0)
(30, 0)

p1(e)

−34.78
0.08
0.56
0.80
8.62
8.60
8.59
8.58
8.57
8.57
8.56
8.54
8.54
8.54

p2(e)

−34.78
3.63
4.15
4.41
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

ϕ1(e)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Accommodative equilibrium
ϕ2(e)
0.00
0.22
0.22
0.22
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

e
(1, 1)
(2, 1)
(3, 1)
(4, 1)
(5, 1)
(6, 1)
(4, 4)
(5, 4)
(5, 5)
(6, 5)
(6, 6)
(11, 11)
(26, 26)
(30, 30)

p1(e)
5.05
5.34
5.45
5.51
5.54
5.56
5.65
5.56
5.57
5.50
5.51
5.29
5.24
5.24

p2(e)
5.05
6.29
6.65
6.82
6.93
7.00
5.65
5.68
5.57
5.59
5.51
5.29
5.24
5.24

ϕ1(e)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

ϕ2(e)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Note: Restricted to mode with e 1  ≥ e2 .

For the aggressive equilibrium, the left panel of Table 2 reports the most likely
industry structure at various times T as given by the mode of the transient distribution μT along with firms’ pricing decisions and non-operating probabilities. After
the industry has emerged from the preemption battle in period 1, the leader (firm 1)
prices aggressively in order to keep the follower (firm 2) in the exit zone. By period 4
the follower has most likely exited the industry and the leader raises its price. From
thereon, the industry remains an entrenched monopoly. For the accommodative equilibrium, after the industry emerges from the preemption battle in period 1, the leader
enjoys a competitive advantage over the follower. As can be seen in the right panel,
this advantage is temporary: after period 5 the most likely industry structure is symmetric (or almost symmetric). The industry ultimately becomes a mature duopoly.
A. Industry Structure, Conduct, and Performance
To succinctly describe an equilibrium we use six metrics of industry structure,
conduct, and performance (SCP).
Structure: Expected long-run Herfindahl index:

 	

μ∞
 ( e )
  
   HHI(e),
HHI ∞ =  ∑    _
∞
e≥(0, 0) 1 − μ (0, 0)

where the Herfindahl index in state e is
   2
Dn ( p1(e), p2(e))
___
HHI(e) = ∑     
      .
D1 ( p1(e), p2(e)) + D2 ( p1(e), p2(e))
n=1 
2

 ultiple equilibria. A closed communicating class is a set of states from which there is no escape once the indusm
try has entered it. In the aggressive equilibrium, once the industry evolves into a mature monopoly, respectively,
duopoly it remains a mature monopoly, respectively, duopoly forever. The transient distribution in period 1,000
accounts for the probability of reaching any one of these closed communicating classes, starting from state (1, 1)
in period 0.
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If HHI ∞
 > 0.5, then an asymmetric industry structure arises and persists.
Conduct: Expected long-run average price:

μ∞
  ( e )
_
_
 	 p   ∞ = ∑   __
  
   p   (e),
∞
e≥(0, 0) 1 − μ   (0, 0)
where the (share-weighted) average price in state e is

2
Dn ( p1  (e), p2  (e))
_
p   (e) = ∑  ___
   
      pn  (e).
 	
D1 ( p1  (e), p2  (e)) + D2 ( p1  (e), p2  (e))
n=1 

Performance: Expected long-run consumer surplus:

 	

∑  μ
 ∞ ( e )  CS (e),
CS ∞
  = 
e

where CS(e) is consumer surplus in state e.
Expected long-run total surplus:
 	

{

2

e

n=1

where PSn(e) is the producer surplus of firm n in state e.20
Expected discounted consumer surplus:
 	

∞

CS NPV = ∑ β T ∑  μ
 T ( e )  CS (e).
T=0

Expected discounted total surplus:
 	

}

 ∞ ( e )  CS (e) + 
∑  PSn  (e) ,
TS ∞
  = ∑  μ

∞

e

{

2

}

TS NPV = ∑ β T ∑  μ
 T( e )  CS(e) + 
∑  PSn  (e) .
T=0

e

n=1

By focusing on the states that arise in the long run (as given by μ∞
 ), CS ∞and
∞
TS  summarize the long-run implications of equilibrium behavior for industry per  summarize the short-run and the long-run
formance. In contrast, CS NPV and TS NPV
implications that arise along entire time paths of states (as given by μ0, μ1, …).
 reflect any short-run competition for the market as well as
Hence, CS NPVand TS NPV
any long-run competition in the market.
Table 3 illustrates the SCP metrics for the equilibria at the beginning of Section III.
The industry is substantially more likely to be monopolized under the aggressive
equilibrium than under the accommodative equilibrium. Prices are higher, and consumer and total surplus are lower, under the aggressive equilibrium than under the

20

See the online Appendix for expressions for CS(e) and PSn (e).
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Table 3—Industry Structure, Conduct, and Performance.
Aggressive and Accommodative Equilibria

HHI ∞
_∞
 p    
CS ∞

TS ∞

CS NPV
 
TS NPV
 

Aggressive equilibrium

Accommodative equilibrium

0.96
8.26
1.99
6.09
104.18
110.33

0.50
5.24
5.46
7.44
109.07
120.14

accommodative equilibrium. The difference between the equilibria is smaller for
CS NPV
  than for CS ∞ because the former metric accounts for the competition for
the market in the short run that manifests itself in the deep well and trench of the
aggressive equilibrium. The competition for the market in the short run mitigates to
some extent the lack of competition in the market in the long run.
B. Equilibrium Correspondence
For clarity, we use our metric of industry structure to depict one-dimensional
slices through the equilibrium correspondence. See the online Appendix for additional figures and tables.
Progress Ratio.—Panel A of Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium correspondence
by plotting HHI ∞
 against ρ. If ρ = 1 there is no learning-by-doing, while if ρ = 0
the learning economies become infinitely strong in the sense that the marginal cost
of production jumps from κ for the first unit to 0 for any further unit. The progress
ratio ρ therefore determines the possible extent of efficiency gains from pricing
aggressively in order to move down the learning curve.
There are multiple equilibria for ρ from 0 to 0.80. H
 −1(ρ) involves a main path
(labeled MP) with one equilibrium for ρ from 0 to 1, a semi-loop (SL) with two
equilibria for ρ from 0 to 0.80, and three loops ( L1, L2, and L3) each with two equilibria for ρ from 0.25 to 0.70, 0.35 to 0.65, and 0.36 to 0.53, respectively.
The equilibria on MP are accommodative. The industry evolves into a mature
duopoly with HHI ∞= 0.5 as in the accommodative equilibrium at the beginning
of Section III. The equilibria on the lower fold of SL similarly involve an almost
symmetric industry structure. The equilibria on the upper fold of SL as well as
those on L1, L2, and L3are aggressive. As in the aggressive equilibrium at the
beginning of Section III, the industry evolves into an entrenched monopoly with
HHI ∞
 ≈ 1.0.21
Product Differentiation.—Panel B of Figure 2 plots HHI ∞
 against σ. The degree
of product differentiation σ influences how desirable it is for a firm to induce its
rival to exit the industry: As σ → 0 the goods become homogenous, competition
Aggressive equilibria can arise even if there is practically no learning-by-doing, e.g., if ρ = 0.99 and σ = 0.10
or ρ = 0.98 and σ = 0.30. See the online Appendix for details.
21
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Panel A
1

L1, L2, L3

HHI ∞

0.9

SL

0.8

0.7

0.6
MP

0.5
1

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

Panel B

ρ

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

1

HHI ∞

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6
MP

0.5
0

0.5

1

Panel C

σ

1.5

2

2.5

3

1

HHI ∞

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

Aggressive equilibrium
Accommodative equilibrium

MP

0.5
−1.5

0

1.5

3

4.5

6

7.5

X
Figure 2. Equilibrium Correspondence
_

Note: Expected long-run Herfindahl index: slice along ρ ∈ [0, 1] (panel A), σ ∈ [0, 3] (panel B), and X 
  ∈ [−1.75, 7.5]
(panel C).
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intensifies, and profits fall. Product differentiation is already very weak for σ = 0.3
and moderately strong for σ = 3.22
There are multiple equilibria for σ below 1.10. While H
 −1(σ) involves just a main
path (labeled MP), multiple equilibria arise as this path bends back on itself. The
equilibria on the lower fold of MP are accommodative and the industry evolves into
a mature duopoly. The equilibria on the upper fold of MP are aggressive and the
industry evolves into an entrenched monopoly.
_

∞
Scrap
_ Value.—Panel C of Figure 2 plots HHI  against the  X . The expected scrap
value X 
 determines how easy it is for a firm to induce its rival to exit the industry.
Because a firm_can always guarantee
itself a _
nonnegative short-run profit, exit is
_
 < −1.5. As  X  → ∞, exit becomes inevitable.
impossible if  X  + ΔX < 0 ⇔ X 
At_the same _time, however,
exit is immediately followed by entry. In particular,
_
 + ΔS⇔ X  > 7.5, then a potential entrant has an incentive to incur
if X 
 − ΔX > S 
23
the setup cost for the exclusive purpose
_ of receiving the scrap value.
_
There are multiple equilibria for X 
 from 0.7 to 6.5. H−1
 (X 
 ) involves a main
path (labeled MP) that bends back on itself. The equilibria on the lower fold of
MP are accommodative and the industry evolves into a mature duopoly. The equilibria on the upper fold of MP are aggressive and the industry evolves into an
entrenched monopoly.
Overall, many equilibria are aggressive. In these equilibria, predation-like behavior arises. Generally speaking, aggressive equilibria tend to arise with a lower progress ratio
_ ρ, a lower degree of product differentiation σ, and a higher expected scrap
value X 
 .24 Aggressive equilibria often coexist with accommodative equilibria, and
multiplicity of equilibria is the norm rather than the exception. The sheer number
of equilibria can be staggering; we have found up to 221 equilibria for some parameterizations.25 However, the number of equilibria varies widely across parameterizations; see the online Appendix for details.

IV. Economic Significance of Predatory Incentives

Are predatory incentives economically significant in their impact on the evolution of the industry? To address this question, we imagine an omniscient regulator that can force firms to ignore the predatory incentives in setting their prices.
To do so, the regulator imposes a constraint Ξ1( p1, p2(e), e) = 0 on the maximization problem on the right-hand side of the Bellman equation (3) that a firm solves
in the price-setting phase. The constraint “switches off ” the predatory incentives
22
The homotopy algorithm sometimes fails for σ below 0.3. For σ = 0.3 in an emerging duopoly the own- and
cross-price elasticities of demand are −28.17 and 6.38, respectively, at static Nash equilibrium prices and −6.42
and 6.42 in a mature duopoly. For σ = 3 the own- and cross-price elasticities are −3.72 and 0.84, respectively, in an
emerging duopoly, and −1.66 and 1.07 in a mature duopoly.
_
_
23
Our model cannot capture perfect contestability, which requires ΔX = ΔS= 0 in addition to X 
 = S 
.
24
With more than two firms, the incentive to price aggressively may be muted because it is costly and eliminating a competitor from the industry benefits all surviving firms. A firm may thus prefer another firm to price aggressively rather than to do so itself. This externality is well-understood in merger analysis (Stigler 1950). Because the
benefits of focusing on two firms are substantial, both in terms of computational burden and in terms of presenting
the results, we leave it to future work to extend the analysis to more firms.
25
Many of these equilibria differ in the number, location, or depth of the trenches and corresponding exit zones
but induce broadly similar industry dynamics.

VOL. 104 NO. 3

besanko et al.: the economics of predation

889

according to a particular definition. For example, according to Definition 2 the predatory incentives are [U1(e) − U1(e1, e2  + 1) ], so the constraint is Ξ1( p1, p2(e), e)
= mr1( p1, p2(e)) − c(e1) + [ U1(e1  + 1, e2) − U1(e) ]= 0. We use the homotopy
method to compute the symmetric Markov perfect equilibria of the counterfactual
game with the conduct restriction in place. As described in
_ Section II,
_ we compute
three intersecting two-dimensional slices along (ρ, σ), (ρ, X ), and (σ, X ).
A. Counterfactual and Equilibrium Correspondences
Our computations show that for all parameterizations the counterfactual is unique
for Definition 1 but not necessarily for Definitions 2 and 3, where we have found
up to 3 and 103, respectively, counterfactuals for some parameterizations. Even for
Definition 3, however, there tend to be fewer counterfactuals than equilibria for a
given parameterization.
Figure 3 illustrates the counterfactual correspondences for Definitions 1–3 by
plotting HHI ∞
 against ρ. For clarity, we again focus on one-dimensional slices. We
superimpose the equilibrium correspondence H
 −1
 (ρ) from Figure 2.
For Definitions 1 and 2, the counterfactual correspondence consists of a main path.
In the counterfactuals the industry evolves into a mature duopoly with HHI ∞
 = 0.5.
Further inspection shows that the counterfactuals are accommodative.26 While the
accommodative equilibria on MP and the lower fold of SL have a counterfactual
“nearby,” the aggressive equilibria on the upper fold of SL as well as those on L1, L2,
and L3do not. For example, for the baseline parameterization, the accommodative but
not the aggressive equilibrium seems to have a counterfactual counterpart.
By contrast, the counterfactual correspondence for Definition 3 resembles the
equilibrium correspondence and consists of a main path, a semi-loop, and one loop.
The counterfactuals span the same range of industry structures as the equilibria.
Most, but not all, equilibria have a counterfactual “nearby.”
B. Eliminated and Surviving Equilibria
By illustrating that there are equilibria that do not have a counterfactual counterpart, Figure 3 suggests that some equilibria hinge on the predatory incentives.
Put differently, forcing firms to ignore the predatory incentives in setting their
prices eliminates some equilibria whereas other equilibria survive. To formalize this
intuition, we use the homotopy method to link the counterfactual and equilibrium
correspondences. Instead of abruptly “switching off ” the predatory incentives, we
gradually drive them to zero. For Definition 2, for example, we put a weight λ on
[ U1(e) − U1(e1, e2  + 1) ]in forming the constraint Ξ1( p1, p2(e), e) = 0, and we then
allow the homotopy method to vary λ (along with the vector of values and policies
x = (V1, U1, p1, ϕ1)). At λ = 1 we have an equilibrium and at λ = 0 we have a counterfactual. We say that an equilibrium survives if, starting from λ = 1, the homotopy reaches the counterfactual correspondence. A surviving equilibrium smoothly
deforms into a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of the counterfactual game
26

This is not true elsewhere in parameter space, e.g., at lower levels of product differentiation than the baseline
parameterization.
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Figure 3. Counterfactual and Equilibrium Correspondences
Notes: Expected long-run Herfindahl index for Definitions 1–3 (panels A, B, and C) along with
eliminated (dashed line) and surviving (solid line) equilibria. Slice along ρ ∈ [0, 1].
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by gradually tightening the conduct restriction. We say that an equilibrium is eliminated if the homotopy algorithm returns to the equilibrium correspondence.27
Figure 3 distinguishes between eliminated and surviving equilibria for Defi
nitions 1–3. Definitions 1 and 2 eliminate the aggressive equilibria that are associated with higher expected long-run Herfindahl indices whereas the accommodative
equilibria that are associated with lower expected long-run Herfindahl indices
survive. By contrast, some of the more aggressive equilibria survive Definition 3,
along with all the more accommodative ones. Nevertheless, Definition 3 eliminates
at least some of the aggressive equilibria.
To illustrate, for the baseline parameterization with ρ = 0.75, all three equilibria (including the aggressive and accommodative equilibria at the beginning of
Section III) survive Definition 3. For ρ = 0.8, one of the three equilibria survives;
 = 0.89 are elimithe two most aggressive equilibria with HHI ∞
 = 0.80 and HHI ∞
nated. For ρ = 0.7 three of the five equilibria survive; again the two most aggressive
 = 1.00 are eliminated.
equilibria with HHI ∞= 0.99 and HHI ∞
These patterns are general. The first row of Table 4 shows the percentage of elimi_
X ),
nated and
_ surviving equilibria for the two-dimensional slices along (ρ, σ), (ρ, 
and (σ, X ) through the equilibrium correspondence. We restrict attention to parameterizations with multiple equilibria because if an equilibrium is unique, then (under
some regularity conditions) it necessarily survives. In line with Figure 3, the broader
Definitions 1 and 2 eliminate many more equilibria than the narrower Definition 3.
The remaining rows of Table 4 show how industry structure, conduct, and performance differ between eliminated and surviving equilibria. We report averages and
standard deviations of the SCP metrics that equally weigh parameterizations in order
to compensate for the different number of equilibria at different parameterizations.
In the long run, the eliminated equilibria have, on average, higher concentration
and prices and lower consumer and total surplus than the surviving equilibria. The
eliminated equilibria thus tend to be “worse” in the long run than the surviving
equilibria.
The eliminated equilibria also have, on average, lower discounted consumer and
total surplus than the surviving equilibria. These differences are, however, much
smaller than the differences in the corresponding long-run metrics. This is because,
although they have less competition in the market in the long run, the eliminated
equilibria tend to have more competition for the market in the short run than the surviving equilibria. As consumers benefit—at least in the short run—from the aggressive pricing in the wells and trenches that are part and parcel of competition for the
market, the difference between eliminated and surviving equilibria is much smaller
 .
for CS NPVthan for CS ∞
In sum, forcing firms to ignore the predatory incentives in setting their prices
eliminates equilibria involving high concentration and prices and low consumer and
total surplus in the long run. The broader Definitions 1 and 2 eliminate many more
such equilibria than the narrower Definition 3. Along with the predation-like behavior, a fair amount of competition for the market is, however, eliminated.

27

See Case B in Figure 1 in Borkovsky, Doraszelski, and Kryukov (2010) for an example of such a return.
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Table 4—Eliminated and Surviving Equilibria for Definitions 1–3
_

(ρ, σ)

elim.
surv.
HHI ∞ elim.

_

p 
 ∞

CS ∞


TS ∞

_

(ρ, X )

(σ, X 
)

SRP
1

DCV
2

REX
3

SRP
1

DCV
2

REX
3

SRP
1

DCV
2

REX
3

98%
1%

96%
1%

49%
23%

97%
3%

96%
3%

61%
15%

97%
2%

97%
2%

69%
14%

0.95
(0.11)

0.95
(0.11)

0.97
(0.08)

0.87
(0.12)

0.87
(0.12)

0.88
(0.11)

0.93
(0.10)

0.93
(0.10)

0.94
(0.09)

8.30
(0.67)

surv.

0.81
(0.24)

0.80
(0.24)

0.87
(0.19)

0.54
(0.13)

0.54
(0.13)

0.78
(0.20)

0.82
(0.22)

0.81
(0.22)

elim.

7.95
(1.38)

7.96
(1.38)

8.23
(1.25)

6.64
(1.64)
3.42
(1.91)

6.63
(1.64)

3.41
(1.92)

6.65
(1.70)

5.89
(2.20)

8.23
(0.78)

7.57
(1.50)

8.24
(0.78)

7.54
(1.49)

7.91
(1.21)

3.65
(1.73)

3.65
(1.73)

3.63
(1.79)

1.98
(0.94)

1.97
(0.94)

1.91
(0.82)

surv.

6.43
(3.01)

6.28
(3.04)

7.03
(2.35)

elim.

2.19
(1.50)

2.18
(1.50)

1.87
(1.33)

0.87
(0.18)

surv.

3.86
(3.30)

4.03
(3.34)

3.19
(2.58)

7.23
(2.01)

7.24
(2.02)

4.50
(2.38)

2.76
(1.81)

2.80
(1.80)

elim.

8.21
(1.80)

8.20
(1.82)

8.13
(1.85)

8.77
(1.38)

8.78
(1.38)

8.76
(1.43)

6.59
(0.41)

6.59
(0.41)

6.58
(0.40)

surv.
CS NPV
  elim.
surv.
TS NPV
  elim.
surv.

2.36
(1.47)

8.66
(2.05)

8.71
(2.06)

8.40
(1.93)

9.55
(1.44)

9.58
(1.43)

9.02
(1.41)

6.84
(0.55)

6.83
(0.55)

152.05
(38.51)

151.91
(39.02)

151.15
(39.47)

152.61
(31.39)

152.62
(31.39)

151.55
(31.76)

105.07
(4.97)

105.05
(4.96)

104.57
(4.85)

157.85
(38.67)

157.70
(39.18)

156.72
(39.67)

168.43
(31.32)

168.44
(31.31)

168.56
(31.82)

119.28
(7.77)

119.27
(7.77)

119.36
(7.81)

152.95
(38.98)

162.16
(41.15)

153.78
(39.16)

163.20
(41.30)

151.13
(38.80)

158.97
(40.02)

155.43
(30.62)

173.68
(32.20)

156.00
(30.43)

174.29
(32.05)

153.08
(30.92)

170.07
(31.59)

106.25
(4.16)

120.14
(7.01)

106.08
(3.96)

119.89
(6.81)

6.72
(0.51)

105.55
(4.60)

119.61
(7.39)

Notes: Industry structure, conduct, _and performance. Uniformly spaced grid (ρ, σ) ∈ {0.0, 0.05, … , 1.0}
_
× {0.1, 0.2, …, 3.0} (left panel), (ρ, X ) ∈ {0.0, 0.05, … , 1.0} × {−1.5, −1, … , 7.5} (middle panel), and (σ, X )
∈ {0.1, 0.2, … , 3.0} × {−1.5, −1, … , 7.5} (right panel), limited to parameterizations with multiple equilibria.
Percentages in first row do not add up if the homotopy algorithm crashed and we have been unable to deduce survival or elimination from adjacent equilibria on the solution path. Averages with standard deviations in parentheses
in remaining rows.

In the presence of multiple equilibria, the underlying primitives do not suffice to
tie down equilibrium behavior and industry dynamics. Which equilibrium is being
played additionally depends on firms’ expectations regarding the evolution of the
industry (Besanko et al. 2010). Our analysis suggests that guiding these expectations toward “good” equilibria by creating a business environment in which firms
anticipate that predatory pricing “does not work” (by issuing general guidelines
about how allegations of predation are handled, speaking out against predation, pursuing high-profile cases, etc.) can be a powerful tool for antitrust policy.
C. Impact of Predatory Incentives
The elimination-survival analysis illustrates the extent to which the predatory
incentives according to a particular definition are responsible for “bad” equilibria.
Further quantifying the impact of the predatory incentives on the evolution of the
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Table 5—Impact of Predatory Incentives for Definitions 1–3
_

(ρ, σ)
Eqbm.
HHI ∞
_∞

p 
  
CS ∞
TS ∞
CS NPV
TS NPV

0.64
(0.22)

_

)
(ρ, X 

SRP
1

DCV
2

REX
3

0.56
(0.16)

0.56
(0.15)

0.61
(0.19)

Eqbm.
0.71
(0.20)

(σ, X 
)

SRP
1

DCV
2

REX
3

0.50
(0.02)

0.50
(0.02)

0.68
(0.16)

Eqbm.
0.62
(0.20)

SRP
1

DCV
2

REX
3

0.53
(0.11)

0.54
(0.13)

0.60
(0.18)

6.71
(2.58)

5.92
(2.82)

5.89
(2.82)

6.43
(2.53)

6.13
(2.65)

4.12
(2.77)

4.12
(2.77)

5.90
(2.37)

7.26
(1.05)

6.59
(1.17)

6.70
(1.18)

7.17
(1.01)

8.56
(2.97)

8.77
(2.98)

8.76
(3.00)

8.61
(3.00)

8.03
(2.72)

8.52
(2.88)

8.52
(2.88)

8.14
(2.74)

7.61
(0.72)

7.76
(0.51)

7.75
(0.53)

7.64
(0.69)

4.57
(2.66)

5.41
(2.63)

5.46
(2.59)

4.88
(2.48)

123.59
70.03 121.31 122.14
(49.92) (31.78) (49.82) (49.28)

156.54 142.01 157.60 156.67
(57.38) (51.31) (57.92) (57.82)

4.41
(2.64)

6.65
(2.62)

6.65
(2.62)

4.67
(2.28)

133.35
70.10 131.58 131.61
(54.76) (25.36) (54.51) (53.78)
149.82 135.68 151.36 150.52
(55.04) (50.42) (56.03) (55.33)

4.02
(1.38)

4.76
(0.90)

96.91
57.94
(8.24) (10.30)

4.64
(1.04)

93.90
(8.41)

4.13
(1.28)

96.49
(7.71)

128.03 113.14 127.48 128.11
(8.57) (6.41) (7.65) (8.43)

Notes: Industry structure, conduct, _and performance. Uniformly spaced grid (ρ, σ) ∈ {0.0, 0.05, … , 1.0}
_
× {0.1, 0.2, …, 3.0} (left panel), (ρ, X ) ∈ {0.0, 0.05, … , 1.0} × {−1.5, −1, … , 7.5} (middle panel), and (σ, X )
∈ {0.1, 0.2, … , 3.0} × {−1.5, −1, … , 7.5} (right panel). Averages with standard deviations in parentheses.

industry requires directly comparing counterfactuals to equilibria. The multiplicity
of counterfactuals and equilibria makes such a comparison difficult: which counterfactual should be compared to which equilibrium?
Positing an out-of-equilibrium process by which agents adjust to a shock to the
system is beyond the scope of this paper. To nevertheless get some indication of
what might happen when firms are forced to ignore the predatory incentives in setting their prices, Table 5 reports side-by-side the SCP metrics for equilibria and
counterfactuals. Similar to Table 4, Table 5 reports averages and standard deviations
that equally weigh parameterizations.
On average, the counterfactuals have lower concentration and prices and higher
consumer and total surplus in the long run than the equilibria. As a consequence of
restricted competition for the market, the counterfactuals also have lower discounted
consumer surplus than the equilibria. The differences between counterfactuals and
equilibria are more pronounced for the broader Definitions 1 and 2 that eliminate
many more aggressive equilibria than for the narrower Definition 3. Overall, Table 5
highlights that antitrust authorities may face a tension between making future consumers better off and current consumers worse off.
 are, on averTable 5 further shows that CS NPV
 and—to a lesser extent—also TS NPV
age, much lower for the counterfactuals under Definition 1 than for the equilibria.
By shutting down the advantage-building motive Definition 1 denies the efficiency
gains from pricing aggressively in order to move down the learning curve. It further
annihilates the intensive competition for the market in the well of an aggressive
equilibrium. It thus tends to “throw the baby” (pricing aggressively to pursue efficiency) “out with the bath water” (predation-like behavior in aggressive equilibria).
While the averages in Table 5 provide a “broad brush” view of the impact of the
predatory incentives on the evolution of the industry, the standard deviations indicate that this impact can differ depending on the parameterization. For example,
forcing firms to ignore the predatory incentives in setting their prices according to
Definition 3 tends to improve the SCP metrics for the baseline parameterization with
ρ = 0.75 and to worsen them for ρ = 0.7. In this respect, our analysis echoes the
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point made by Cabral and Riordan (1997) and Farrell and Katz (2005) that, depending on the details, predatory pricing can either harm or benefit consumers. Hence,
a more “scalpel-like” approach to analyzing predatory incentives may be warranted
that, ideally, starts with tailoring the model to the institutional realities of the industry under study and then estimates the underlying primitives.
V. Conclusions

In this paper we formally characterize predatory pricing in a modern
industry-dynamics framework. Our dynamic pricing model endogenizes competitive advantage and industry structure. It gives rise to an advantage-building
and an advantage-denying motive under fairly general conditions that encompass
learning-by-doing, network effects, switching costs, and much more. We separate
a firm’s incentives for pricing aggressively to eliminate competitors from the pursuit of efficiency by decomposing the equilibrium pricing condition.
We depart from the existing literature on predation in two key aspects. First, rather
than aiming for an ironclad definition of predation, we decompose the equilibrium
pricing condition to define a firm’s predatory pricing incentives in a variety of ways.
Second, rather than argue for (or against) the merits of a particular definition of
predation on conceptual grounds, we directly measure the impact of the predatory
incentives (according to the various definitions) on industry structure, conduct, and
performance.
As an illustrative example we numerically analyze a model of learning-by-doing.
Behavior resembling conventional notions of predatory pricing—aggressive pricing
followed by reduced competition—arises routinely. This casts doubt on the notion
that predatory pricing is a myth and does not have to be taken seriously by antitrust
authorities.
Aggressive equilibria involving predation-like behavior often coexist with accommodative equilibria involving much less aggressive pricing. Multiple equilibria arise
in our model if, for given demand and cost fundamentals, there is more than one set
of firms’ expectations regarding the value of continued play that is consistent with
rational expectations about equilibrium behavior and industry dynamics. Forcing
firms to ignore the predatory incentives in setting their prices can short-circuit
the expectation that predatory pricing “works,” and, in this way, it can eliminate
some—or even all—of the aggressive equilibria. The broader Definitions 1 and 2 of
predatory incentives eliminate many more equilibria than the narrower Definition 3.
Along with the predation-like behavior in the aggressive equilibria, a fair amount of
competition for the market is, however, eliminated.
Our analysis affords some broad conclusions. First, by viewing a dynamic world
from the vantage point of a static model of profit maximization, Definition 1 annihilates competition for the market and is thus very costly for consumers and society
in the short run. As it is closely related to Definition 1, this likely carries over to the
classic Areeda and Turner (1975) test that equates predatory pricing with below-cost
pricing. Antitrust policy based on a static model of profit maximization is likely to
be “too hawkish” (Edlin and Farrell 2004, p. 502) if firms pursue efficiency on a
learning curve or face other intertemporal trade-offs and may put an end to the competition for long-run advantage that leads to favorable deals for consumers.
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Second, because a fair amount of competition for the market is eliminated along
with the predation-like behavior, antitrust authorities may face a tension between
making future consumers better off and making current consumers worse off. This
tension resonates with Judge (now US Supreme Court Justice) Stephen Breyer’s
“bird-in-hand” view of predatory pricing: “[T]he antitrust laws rarely reject such
beneficial ‘birds in hand’ [an immediate price cut] for the sake of more speculative
‘birds in the bush’ [ preventing exit and thus preventing increases in price in the
future].” 28 By isolating the elements of pricing behavior that are aimed at impeding
a rival’s pursuit of efficiency (Definition 2) or viability (Definition 3), we provide
an analytical foundation for how antitrust authorities may navigate this tension so
as to strike a balance between the notion that any deviation from short-run profit
maximization is predatory and the presumption that any aggressive pricing that
arises as part of competition for long-run advantage is legitimate.
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